The Securities and Exchange Commission has accused Goldman Sachs of devising a financial product that it intended to fail: that is, designing an "investment" that was doomed from the start, so that one of its customers, an investment bank named Paulson & Co. (no relation to the Paulson & Co. brokerage based on Front Avenue in Portland) could bet against the investment.
Two Puckish thoughts occurred to me. First, Oregon and (I presume) many other states have products liability laws, which make a manufacturer of a product strictly liable to the ultimate consumer if the product is defective and causes a death or personal injury. Those laws apply to tangible products only, not to intangibles such as investment contracts. Also, a legal rule called the "economic loss doctrine" says that a consumer can't recover damages in tort from the manufacturer of a product who didn't sell the product directly to the consumer if the consumer's damages are purely economic and not physical. So for example a farmer who buys a defective tractor from a dealer can recover damages from the tractor's manufacturer if the tractor destroys the farmer's wheat, because the tractor is physically damaging the crop, but not if the tractor casts the harvested wheat to the four winds without physically damaging it.
Second, Sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the uniform commercial code, adopted in every state except possibly Louisiana, imply two warranties for goods sold in commerce. One implied warranty is that the goods are merchantable, meaning that they conform to their labeling and are of ordinary quality, suited for the purpose for which similar goods are ordinarily used (I'm leaving out some things that don't affect my argument). The other implied warranty is that, if the seller knows the buyer will use the goods for a particular purpose, the goods are fit for that particular purpose.
The implied UCC warranties apply to "goods," which is defined to exclude investment securities. A legislature might, however, extend this concept to investment securities, and in particular to securities such as derivatives that don't represent a share in any productive enterprise but are simply bets on how other securities will perform.
And a creative lawyer might argue that the economic loss doctrine should not prevent the buyer of securities that were designed to fail from recovering its economic losses from the manufacturer of the securities, since the function of securities investment contracts is to provide a chance for economic gain or a buffer against economic loss. If the buyers can prove that Goldman Sachs designed these securities to fail (and at this point I'm not suggesting that they can) then they have an appealing theory under existing products liability law, and several sets of state laws from which to choose. Why should manufacturers of securities be held to lower standards than manufacturers of security systems?
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