The balance sheets of American banks are bad, for two main reasons. One reason is that many banks, principally regional and community banks, lent too much money to developers without paying enough attention to whether their communities had homebuyers to buy the houses the developers were buying. The other reason is that some banks, mainly the large banks, bought derivative securities that they didn't really understand, and for which there is now no resale market.
Banks are required to hold sums in cash, in federal funds (the same thing, really), or in short-term federal securities as reserves against possible losses on their assets. Banks don't have to reserve anything against United States treasury obligations. They have to reserve a little bit against municipal bonds, more against ordinary loans where the borrower's paying as agreed, still more against loans where the borrower's paying but the collateral isn't worth much, and much more against loans where the borrower isn't paying or has gone broke. Banks also have to maintain a certain ratio of equity to assets. For this discussion let's say it's 8%, meaning that a bank with $1 billion of assets must have $80 million of equity. The equity, unlike the reserves, doesn't have to be in cash.
Suppose a bank is holding $100 million of weird derivative securities, which until last year it could have sold for $100 million. The bank could count those securities on its balance sheet at their market value of $100 million, and would likely have had to reserve only 1% or so, $1 million, against the likelihood of loss of value of those securities.
Then came the meltdown in the market for derivative securities. Many securities attracted no bids -- that is, no one was willing to buy them at any price, even though they were making their payments as scheduled. That made their market value zero under the accounting rules for banks. Our hypothetical $1 billion bank with $100 million of derivatives, now freshly marked down to $0, now has an equity of $20 million below zero.
That's bad. The Fed and the FDIC don't like banks to have negative equity. Hence the plan, which may pass, to allow banks to sell their bad assets to a new bank to be formed solely for the purpose of buying the bad assets of other banks. Our hypothetical bank could sell its $100 million of derivatives to Uncle Sam's Bad Bank for, let's say, $80 million, which turns the bank into a $980 million bank with $60 million of equity. Not quite as good as it was before the crash, but still solvent.
More simply, the government proposes to isolate the bad assets of the banking system into a single Bad Bank, leaving the good assets to the private banks. That's all very well, but it doesn't go far enough. Who got those assets onto the balance sheets of the banks? The Bad Bankers did, that's who. Therefore, I propose the Laquedem Kick The Bad Bankers Out On Their Assets Program. Each bank that participates in the Bad Bank program will identify the Bad Bankers who purchased, approved, and budgeted for those assets who are within the top three levels of management of the participating bank. The employment contracts of those Bad Bankers will be assigned to the Bad Bank, and they will leave the employ of the banks. In effect, the government will require the major banks to kick the Bad Bankers' Assets (spell it how you like) into the Bad Bank. Shareholders of the participating banks won't have to stand the expense of paying the contracts of the Bad Bankers. If the Bad Bankers are to collect on their lavish employment contracts, they will have to figure out how to make the Bad Assets pay. For, to turn a phrase used by the anti-gun lobby, "Loans don't kill banks. Lenders do."
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