For fifty years, students of American foreign policy have learned to associate the name of George Kennan, an American diplomat from 1926 to 1953, with the word "containment," referring to America's policy toward (against?) the Soviet Union that developed after World War II ended, largely in reaction to Mr. Kennan's "Long Telegram" of 1946 and his article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," attributed simply to "X" when Foreign Affairs published it in 1947. Mr. Kennan argued in the Long Telegram that the Soviet government was afraid of the world, opposed to the United States, and wanted to destabilize the world. In the "X" article, he argued that the United States should seek to "contain" Soviet power through what he called "counterforce," meaning (as he explained later) diplomatic and political work rather than straight military force.
Mr. Kennan, who died on March 17 at the age of 101, saw his theory adopted and co-opted by the military, who took "containment" to mean "containment by military force." In the words of The Economist, "the generals and politicians took his words and ran with them." The American involvement in the Vietnam War was one of the results.
Mr. Kennan left the State Department in 1953 when John Foster Dulles told him that he would not get another assignment, and except for a short stint as the ambassador to Yugoslavia, never held another diplomatic position. Yet his basic ideas survived to make him the most influential American diplomatic theorist of the last half of the 20th Century, a fact perhaps better recognized overseas than here, although the Washington Post and New York Times both carried full stories on his death. The Economist allocated its one weekly obituary to him. The Times of London wrote an extended story also.
I surmise that the overseas news sources, certainly the Times of London's report, understand Mr. Kennan's historical importance. I think the Times reporter believes that Mr. Kennan's thought remains relevant today; without once mentioning the current war in Iraq, the reporter describes Mr. Kennan's first book as follows:
Examining one conflict after another, he argued with persuasive eloquence that amour propre and petulance had led America time after time into the wrong wars. As a result, he wrote, America had difficulty “employing force for rational and restricted purposes rather than for purposes which are emotional and to which it is hard to find a rational limit”.
The reporter had also written:
“The American idealisation of our democracy as a model for all the rest of mankind”, he [Mr. Kennan] said, was “wholly unrealistic, vainglorious and silly.” It was not up to America to liberate any nation from internal dictatorship, though it could help to create favourable international conditions and present a good example. * * * He regarded it as deplorable that when other nations failed to abide by these supposedly universal ideals, America succumbed to pique, and attempted to enforce them, whether appropriate or not.
Mr. Kennan was willing to be patient, something others in the diplomacy business might well learn from.
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